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The FMA and the Constitutional Validity of
Magistrate Judges’ Authority to Accept Felony
Guilty Pleas
ABSTRACT
Given the burdens of a growing district court caseload and the fact that
over 97% of criminal convictions result in guilty pleas, efficiency has
necessitated an expanding role for magistrate judges. Within that
expanded role lies a greater need for delegation to magistrate judges to
assist in the practice of guilty plea acceptance. The Federal Magistrates
Act (FMA) permits magistrate judges to take on additional duties so long
as they are “not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States.” Despite the language of the FMA, the Seventh Circuit has been
the first circuit to deny district courts the option to delegate the acceptance
of plea agreements to magistrates. Therefore, the key question on which
this Comment focuses is whether the FMA permits magistrate judges to
personally accept guilty pleas. This Comment answers this question
through an analysis of the history of the FMA, the relevant case law, as
well as a comparative discussion between the Seventh Circuit and its sister
circuits. Ultimately, this Comment proposes that the FMA should be read
to permit federal magistrates the power to accept guilty pleas, consistent
with the jurisprudence of the several circuits and the Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Magistrates Act (FMA)1 has long been read to give a
broader role to federal magistrate judges in the nearly fifty years since its
passage. As a result of that expansive interpretation, federal magistrate
judges enjoy many of the same powers and duties as their Article III
counterparts. The FMA permits magistrate judges to take on additional
duties so long as they are “not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States.”2 The FMA specifically authorizes magistrate judges
1. Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2012).
2. Id. § 636; see also Brendan Linehan Shannon, Note, The Federal Magistrates Act:
A New Article III Analysis for a New Breed of Judicial Officer, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
253, 253 (1991) (“[S]ince Congress passed the Act, congressional amendment of the law
and expansive judicial interpretation have resulted in a new breed of judicial officer.”).
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to preside over certain matters, including civil and misdemeanor trials.3
Beyond the capacity to decide motions, hear evidence, and instruct juries,
several federal courts of appeals have concluded that federal magistrates
also have the power to accept guilty pleas in felony cases, a task that is
arguably comparable to that of a guilty plea colloquy.4 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, recently held that the
Federal Magistrates Act does not permit magistrate judges to accept guilty
pleas even when the parties consent.5 The Seventh Circuit is the first
circuit to deny district courts the option to delegate the acceptance of plea
agreements to magistrates.6
There were over 300,000 cases filed in the federal district courts in
2014, over 70,000 of which were criminal proceedings.7 The FMA was
passed by Congress to ease the rapidly increasing and “overwhelming
caseload” burden of many district courts.8 In 2013, over 97% of criminal
convictions in the United States District Courts were the result of guilty
pleas.9 With the overburdening caseload of federal district courts, there is a
greater need for delegation to magistrate judges to assist in the practice of
guilty plea acceptance.10 Such delegation is in line with many long
recognized duties; magistrate judges are already permitted to preside over
many unspecified aspects of a felony criminal proceeding such as jury
selection and the plea colloquy.11 While these duties are not enumerated
under the FMA, the United States Supreme Court has held these additional
duties to be consistent with Constitution.12 Accepting a felony guilty plea
is comparable to conducting a plea colloquy and involves far less discretion

3. 28 U.S.C. § 636.
4. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 2008).
5. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 887 (7th Cir. 2014).
6. T.J. Hales, Note, Federal Criminal Procedure—Guilty Plea Satisfaction
Guaranteed, 68 SMU L. REV. 283, 283 (2015).
7. U.S. District Courts Combined Civil and Criminal Federal Court Management
Statistics, in FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 1 (Dec. 31, 2014), http://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-statistics/2014/12/31-2.
8. United States v. Khan, 774 F. Supp. 748, 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
9. See U.S. District Courts Criminal Statistical Tables For The Federal Judiciary
Table D-4, in STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (Dec. 31, 2013),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2013/d
ecember/D04Dec13.pdf (finding that of 84,060 total criminal convictions in a twelve-month
period, 81,955 were the result of guilty pleas).
10. See Harden, 758 F.3d at 891 (explaining the desire to promote efficiency in the
district courts and the prevalence of guilty pleas today).
11. See id.
12. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 931–33 (1991).
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than presiding over jury selection.13 The comparability of felony guilty
pleas to the permitted duties under the FMA makes accepting felony guilty
pleas an additional duty consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States.14
In line with the Supreme Court’s determination that federal
magistrates should be permitted additional, unspecified duties, this
Comment argues that the FMA should be read to permit federal magistrates
to accept guilty pleas in felony cases where the parties consent, thereby
absolving any potential constitutional violation. Specifically, the key
question on which this Comment focuses is whether the FMA permits
magistrate judges to go farther and personally accept guilty pleas and find
the defendant guilty—a dispositive step in the criminal process—rather
than making a recommendation to the district court judge. In the interest of
judicial efficiency, there are means by which federal district courts can
ensure that defendants are thoroughly informed and aware of the
dispositive action should they consent, which is the primary concern raised
by opponents of the extended power.
Part I of this Comment provides background information on the FMA
and the relevant precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States. In
Part II, this Comment examines the existing case law from the different
circuits on this issue to provide the reasoning behind courts’ allowance or
disallowance of magistrate judges to accept felony guilty pleas. Part II-A
examines the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit determinations that
federal magistrates may accept felony guilty pleas, while Part II-B
discusses the Seventh Circuit’s recent departure from this reasoning.
Finally, Part III weighs the two approaches and concludes that the FMA
should be read to permit federal magistrates the power to accept guilty
pleas, consistent with the jurisprudence of the several circuits and the
Constitution.
I.

THE FMA: CONGRESS’ INTENT AND THE SUPREME COURT’S
INTERPRETATION

Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests the judicial power
in “one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.”15 The Supreme Court has
interpreted this provision to limit Congress’s ability to vest judicial

13. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 2008).
14. Id.
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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authority in non-Article III judges.16 Accordingly, magistrate judges are
not explicitly listed in Article III but instead are statutorily created.17 The
FMA, which was passed by Congress to ease the rapidly increasing and
overwhelming caseload burden of many district courts, defines the scope of
magistrate judges’ authority.18
In many districts, magistrate judges hear guilty pleas and then, as a
matter of procedure, make a recommendation to the district court judge,
who then decides whether to accept the guilty plea and find the defendant
guilty.19 Ultimately, however, federal magistrate judges can accept felony
guilty pleas because the acceptance of a felony guilty plea is a comparable
duty to others enumerated under the FMA.20
In order to understand the FMA and felony guilty pleas in general, it is
essential to understand the plea process as set out in Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.21 Before a magistrate judge can administer
the plea and sentencing under Rule 11, the defendant must consent to the
magistrate judge’s jurisdiction, and the district judge must assign the case
to the magistrate judge for the taking of the plea.22 This is because the
magistrate judge, unlike the Article III district court judge, is not explicitly
vested with the authority to hear these proceedings.23 Once these steps are
completed, the magistrate judge may accept a guilty plea and is bound by
Rule 11, which sets out the requirements for any judge—magistrate or
district court—in doing so.24
A. The Plea Colloquy and Rule 11
Rule 11 requires the following: “[b]efore the court accepts a plea of
guilty . . . the court must address the defendant personally in open court.25
During this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and determine

16. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58–60 (1982).
17. Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–39 (2012).
18. See United States v. Khan, 774 F. Supp. 748, 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
19. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2003).
Currently, five circuit courts of appeal require a recommendation to be sent to the district
court judge after taking a felony plea. Id. (explaining that a magistrate judge’s taking of a
guilty plea, with the litigant’s consent, qualifies as an additional duty under the FMA).
20. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 2008).
21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
22. See United States v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 2003).
23. See Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2012).
24. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888–90 (7th Cir. 2014).
25. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1).
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that the defendant understands” the consequences contained in Rule 11.26
This open questioning is commonly called the plea colloquy as it involves a
conversation between the judge and the defendant.27 The open court
requirement is to ensure that the plea agreement is on the record and,
thereby, free from the risk of real or apparent unfairness by the attorneys or
the judge.28
If a magistrate judge takes the felony plea upon consent, that judge is
the only one authorized to enter a finding of guilty under Rule 11.29
Therefore, the magistrate judge who personally addressed the defendant in
open court must be the one to accept the plea and enter the finding of guilt
against the defendant.30 While Rule 11 sets out the requirements for the
magistrate judge in the plea process, the FMA was created to help broaden
the responsibilities of magistrate judges as well as outline the boundaries of
their authority.31
B. The History and Scope of the FMA
The FMA was enacted in 1968 to create a corps of new judicial
officers to “cull from the ever-growing workload of the U.S. district
courts.”32 Congress intended the FMA to permit district courts to increase
the scope of magistrate responsibilities as part of a plan to establish a
system capable of increasing the overall efficiency of the federal
judiciary.33 Congress hoped the FMA would help alleviate the federal
district courts’ backlog of cases.34 Aware that other non-enumerated duties
may arise within the federal district courts, section 636(b) was included to

26. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(A)–(N) (requiring the court to inform the defendant of his
or her various rights and to ensure the defendant understands such rights).
27. Id.
28. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment.
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) (2012) (stating that a magistrate judge shall have all powers
and duties conferred or imposed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (explaining that the magistrate judge conducts any or all
proceedings when specifically designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court).
31. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 932 (1991) (articulating the FMA’s policy in
favor of granting federal judges significant leeway to experiment with possible
improvements in the efficiency of the judicial process).
32. S. REP. NO. 90-371, at 9 (1967).
33. Federal Magistrates Act: Hearings on S. 945, H.R. 5502, H.R. 8277, H.R. 8520,
H.R. 8932, H.R. 9970, and H.R. 10841 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong. 81 (1968) (statement of Sen. Joseph D. Tydings) (“The Magistrate
Act specifies [those] . . . areas in which the district courts might be able to benefit from the
magistrate’s services. We did not limit the courts to the areas mentioned.”).
34. Id.
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allow the district courts to delegate a variety of functions to magistrate
judges.35
The FMA defines the scope of the duties of United States magistrate
judges.36 These duties range from entering a sentence for a misdemeanor
to determining certain pretrial matters before the court.37 Additionally,
magistrate judges are permitted to preside over misdemeanor trials with the
parties’ consent.38 Notably, magistrate judges are allowed to undertake
duties that are not enumerated in the FMA, so long as the duties are
constitutional.39 “Constitutional” in this context means those duties that
have not been held to be within the sole domain of Article III judges, such
as presiding over felony trials.40
The acceptance of a guilty plea in a felony case is not a described
power or duty under the FMA.41 Accordingly, answering the question of
the permissibility of magistrates to do so requires an interpretation of the
additional duties clause of the statute to determine whether the FMA
permits judges to discharge that function, regardless of whether the
defendant and the government have provided consent.42
C. The Additional Duties Clause of the FMA
Section 636(b)(3) of the FMA, also known as the additional duties
clause, authorizes district courts to delegate to magistrate judges “such
additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States.”43 This broad provision was somewhat clarified by the
United States Supreme Court in Peretz v. United States,44 which held that
whether a proceeding is one that may be delegated to a magistrate judge

35. Id.
36. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(4), (b)(1)(A) (2012); see also David A. Bell, The Power to
Award Sanctions: Does It Belong in the Hands of Magistrate Judges?, 61 ALB. L. REV. 433,
433 (1997) (“Magistrate judges are often called upon, for example, to rule on discovery and
suppression of evidence motions, issue reports and recommendations on dispositive
motions, adjudicate petty offenses and misdemeanor cases, and even, with the consent of the
parties, preside over the trial of civil actions.”).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (2012).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3).
40. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 872 (1989).
41. Harden, 758 F.3d at 888.
42. Id.
43. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 430 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(3) (2000)).
44. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 933 (1991).
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depends on whether it is “comparable” to the proceedings that the FMA
specifically mentions.45
In order to understand what additional duties are comparable to the
enumerated duties, it is important to review the Supreme Court’s decisions
regarding additional duties under the FMA. In Gomez v. United States,46
the Supreme Court held that those “additional duties” did not encompass
the selection of a jury in a felony trial over a defendant’s objection.47
However, two years later, in Peretz, the Court concluded that a magistrate
judge may oversee jury selection in a felony case because “a district judge
may delegate to a magistrate supervision of entire civil and misdemeanor
trials,” and “[t]hese duties are comparable in responsibility and importance
to presiding over [voir dire] at a felony trial.”48 Therefore the similarity
between criminal voir dire and presiding over civil trials (neither of which
involve a finding of guilt in a criminal case) led to a finding that the FMA
permitted a magistrate judge to preside over voir dire in a criminal case.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that a magistrate judge is
not permitted to conduct a felony trial.49 The Supreme Court came to this
conclusion using the statutory canon of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, giving significance to the careful contours of the authority granted
to the magistrates in the FMA.50 The Court held that the explicit grant of
authority to preside over civil and misdemeanor cases, should be construed
as an implicit withholding of authority to preside over a felony trial.51
While the Supreme Court has addressed felony trials, it has yet to decide
the issue of magistrate judges’ authority to accept felony guilty pleas.
Since the issue has been left to the various circuits, each circuit has used
the Supreme Court’s rulings in Peretz and Gomez to justify its reasoning in
either permitting or denying magistrate judges the authority to accept
felony guilty pleas.
Thus, the district court’s authority to delegate duties to the magistrate
judge boils down to comparability.52 If an unlisted duty is comparable to

45. Id. at 931–33.
46. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
47. Id. at 872.
48. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 933.
49. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 872.
50. Id. (“[T]he carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and
of minor criminal cases should be construed as an implicit withholding of the authority to
preside at a felony trial.”).
51. Id.
52. See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 933.
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those duties listed in the Act, that duty may be performed by the magistrate
judge with the parties’ consent.53
D. The Role of Consent
Another important facet is the imposed requirement that the defendant
first consent for the magistrate to accept his or her plea since the defendant
has the right to appear before an Article III judge.54 Without consent, the
analysis of comparability does not come into play because consent acts as a
“limitation” on the Act’s grant of otherwise “expanded jurisdiction” to
magistrates.55
Though the consent requirement is based on the protection of
individuals’ due process rights, even the most basic rights of criminal
“Waiver is the intentional
defendants are subject to waiver.56
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right . . . .”57 Relevant here,
the United States Supreme Court has previously held that litigants may
waive their personal right to have an Article III judge preside over a civil
trial.58
Even in the context of criminal cases, where life and liberty are at
stake, defendants may waive their rights. A guilty plea is the quintessential
waiver: a “guilty plea is a waiver of important constitutional rights
designed to protect the fairness of a trial.”59 It “is more than an admission
of past conduct; it is the defendant’s consent that judgment of conviction
may be entered without a trial—a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or
judge.”60 However, just as a defendant can consent to an otherwise
unreasonable search and seizure, a defendant can also give consent to a
magistrate to waive his right to a jury trial.
The Supreme Court addressed waiver in the context of magistrate
powers in Peretz.61 As discussed above, the issue in Peretz was whether it
53. Id.
54. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
55. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 931 (quoting Gomez, 490 U.S. at 870).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 528 (1985) (holding that absence
of objection constitutes waiver of the right to be present at all stages of the criminal trial);
Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619 (1960) (holding that failure to object to the
closing of the courtroom constitutes waiver of the right to a public trial); Segurola v. United
States, 275 U.S. 106, 111 (1927) (holding that failure to object constitutes waiver of the
Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure).
57. United States v. Venturella, 585 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2009).
58. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986).
59. Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924, 925 (1974).
60. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
61. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936–37 (1991).
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was proper for a magistrate judge to preside at jury selection. In Peretz, the
Court said, “[a] defendant has no constitutional right to have an Article III
judge preside at jury selection if he has raised no objection to the judge’s
absence.”62 The Court noted that “[t]he defendant’s consent significantly
changed the constitutional analysis” and found there to be “no Article III
problem when a district court judge permits a magistrate to conduct [voir
dire] in accordance with the defendant’s consent.”63
Falling on the side of judicial efficiency and delegation, the Supreme
Court concluded that when “the defendant is indifferent as to whether a
magistrate or a [district] judge should preside, then it makes little sense to
deny the district court the opportunity to delegate that function to a
magistrate, particularly if such a delegation sensibly advances the court’s
interest . . . .”64 Such delegation and efficiency is also served by permitting
a defendant to consent to a felony guilty plea acceptance by a magistrate
judge. Understanding of the consequences of consent is proved when a
defendant neither files any objections with the district court, moves to
withdraw his guilty plea, nor objects to the fact that the magistrate judge
took his plea before the district judge at sentencing.65 Therefore, the
“additional duty” of permitting magistrates to accept felony guilty pleas
does not seem to affect the defendant’s substantial rights or impugn
fairness of judicial proceedings because the defendant knowingly waived
his or her right by consent.66
Ultimately, the precedent has shown that one may waive her
fundamental rights.67 While the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from
a warrantless search, one may waive that right by simply consenting to the
search.68 Similarly, here, a defendant has a right to plead guilty to an
Article III judge, but once she consents to the magistrate’s authority she has

62. Id. at 936.
63. Id. at 932.
64. Id. at 934–35 (quoting Gov’t of V.I. v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 311 (3rd Cir.
1989)).
65. See United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
defendant waived objection to the admission of evidence where counsel withdrew the
motion in limine and offered it into evidence at trial); United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d
831, 841 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendant waived objection to the sentencing
adjustment when the court asked defendant’s lawyer whether he had objected to the
adjustment and the lawyer said “No”); United States v. Newman, 148 F.3d 871, 874, 879
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the defendant waived arguments by stipulating to facts and by
expressly declining to press contentions).
66. United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1996).
67. See Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924, 925 (1974).
68. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
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waived any right previously held.69 Therefore, once the defendant
consents, waiver takes effect and the magistrate may exercise her additional
duty of accepting the guilty plea as permitted by the FMA.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits’ Interpretation
In the two and a half decades following the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Peretz and Gomez, several circuits have continued to expand the role of
federal magistrates in an attempt to ease the burden on the federal judicial
system. The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have interpreted the additional duties clause in light of the
Supreme Court’s decisions and concluded that federal magistrates may
permissibly accept felony guilty pleas with the consent of the defendant.
In United States v. Benton,70 the Fourth Circuit held, whether or not a
report and recommendation was filed, a magistrate could accept a felony
guilty plea so long as the defendant consented.71 The Fourth Circuit, like
several others, recognized that the guilty-plea colloquy required by the Due
Process Clause and Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
may be delegated to magistrate judges in felony cases.72 The court viewed
the acceptance of a plea as “merely the natural culmination of a plea
colloquy.”73 The court noted that compared to tasks unquestionably within
a magistrate’s authority, such as conducting felony voir dire and presiding

69. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936–37.
70. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2008).
71. Id. at 431.
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Gov’t of V.I. v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 311 (3rd Cir. 1989)). The
court said:
Certainly, Benton’s distinction between plea colloquy and plea acceptance does
not appear to necessitate different results under Peretz. The “comprehensive
provisions of Rule 11” not only “carefully explain what a court must inquire
about” and . . . “what [a magistrate] should determine before accepting a
plea.” . . . Thus the acceptance of a plea is merely the natural culmination of a plea
colloquy. Much like a plea colloquy, plea acceptance involves none of the
complexity and requires far less discretion than that necessary to perform many
tasks unquestionably within a magistrate judge’s authority, such as conducting
felony voir dire and presiding over entire civil and misdemeanor trials. It is thus
difficult to see how a plea acceptance is not comparable in responsibility and
importance to a plea colloquy, and therefore an “additional duty” within the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(3).
Id. at 431–32.
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over entire civil and misdemeanor trials, plea acceptance was much less
complicated.74
Other circuits have agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning. For
example, in United States v. Woodard,75 the Eleventh Circuit came to the
same conclusion, noting that conducting a plea colloquy and accepting
guilty pleas was comparable to the FMA’s enumerated duties. The court in
Woodard added, “conducting a plea colloquy, while important, is ‘less
complex’ than several of the duties the FMA expressly authorized
magistrate judges to perform.”76 Moreover, no circuit has held that a
magistrate judge cannot conduct a plea colloquy.77
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit relied on Peretz’s analysis of defendant
consent to potential constitutional violations when it considered a
magistrate’s acceptance of a plea agreement.78 “[W]hen the defendant
consents to proceed before a magistrate judge, the constitutional analysis
changes significantly because no constitutional right is implicated if the
defendant does not object to the absence of an Article III judge.”79 The
court went on to say that the “[d]efendant’s failure to object or otherwise
request review by the district court leaves him in no position to now
complain that the magistrate judge’s taking of his guilty plea, a proceeding
to which he expressly consented, violated his constitutional rights.”80
In consideration of judicial efficiency, the comparability of additional
duties, and Due Process rights through the requirement of consent, the
several circuits have, in line with both the purposes of the FMA and the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, concluded that federal magistrates not
only have the power to conduct a plea colloquy but also to accept the
subsequent felony guilty plea.
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Departure
Despite the several circuits’ conclusions and their well-founded
reasoning, the Seventh Circuit’s recent case has challenged the notion that
federal magistrates may accept a felony guilty plea. In United States v.

74. Id. at 432.
75. United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004).
76. Id. at 1332–33 (quoting United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 632–33 (2d Cir.
1994)).
77. Benton, 523 F.3d at 431.
78. United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1996).
79. Id. at 1250 (citing Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991)).
80. Id. at 1251; see also Benton, 523 F.3d at 432 (noting “a magistrate judge’s
acceptance of a plea, with the consent of the parties, does not appear to present any
constitutional problems, either generally or in this case”).
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Harden,81 the Seventh Circuit held that the FMA does not permit
magistrate judges to accept guilty pleas even when the parties consented to
it. In its decision, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court’s
holding in Peretz, recognizing the FMA does not permit a magistrate judge
to conduct a felony trial.82 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the
acceptance of a felony guilty plea is more like conducting a felony trial
than conducting a misdemeanor trial.83 The court noted, “[t]he task of
accepting a guilty plea is a task too important to be considered a mere
‘additional duty’ permitted under § 636(b)(3): it is more important than the
supervision of a civil or misdemeanor trial, or presiding over [voir dire].”84
The court went on to point out that “because of this importance, the
additional duties clause cannot be stretched to reach the acceptance of
felony guilty pleas, even with a defendant’s consent.”85
The Seventh Circuit viewed the district court judge as the ultimate and
the only decision-maker, not to be intruded upon by the federal
magistrate.86 However, the Seventh Circuit has long allowed a magistrate
to file a report and recommendation to the district court judge.87
Additionally, the court recognized the widespread practice of magistrate
judges conducting a Rule 11(b) colloquy for the purpose of making a report
and recommendation as permissible.88 This common practice allows the
magistrate to hear the defendant’s plea and converse with the defendant
before ultimately recommending his/her opinion for the district court judge
to ultimately decide.89 However, the court in Harden noted that some
circuits go beyond this authority and authorize magistrate judges to accept
guilty pleas without a report and recommendation.90 The Seventh Circuit
differed on this point and it reasoned that without explicit authorization
81. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014).
82. Id. at 890.
83. Id. at 889.
84. Id. at 888.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 891–92 (“[T]he Court has never suggested that magistrate judges, with the
parties’ consent, may perform every duty of an Article III judge, regardless of the duty’s
importance.”).
87. Id. at 891.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1119–22 (9th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Torres, 258 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d
261, 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 631–34 (2d Cir.
1994).
89. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
90. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431–32 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247,
1250–52 (10th Cir. 1996).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol38/iss1/5

12

Hall: The FMA and the Constitutional Validity of Magistrate Judges’ Aut

2016]

THE FMA AND GUILTY PLEAS

143

from Congress, the district court cannot delegate this vital task to
magistrate judges.91
In doing so, the Seventh Circuit dispelled any similarity between a
plea colloquy and the acceptance of a plea. In Harden, the court asserted
that the acceptance of a guilty plea was “dispositive” and required careful
consideration of the defendant’s understanding of the rights being
relinquished.92 The court noted that once a defendant relinquishes this right
it “results in a final and consequential shift in a defendant’s status.”93
Using this reasoning the Seventh Circuit argued that accepting a guilty plea
is quite similar in importance to conducting a felony trial, which magistrate
judges are not permitted to conduct.94
The Seventh Circuit also took a different stance on the issue of
consent in felony guilty plea acceptances, reasoning that accepting a guilty
plea is even more final than a guilty verdict.95 Thus, when accepting a
guilty plea, “the judge is required to conduct a long searching colloquy, as
required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b), to ensure that the
defendant’s waivers of his important rights are ‘voluntary[,]...knowing,
intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.’”96 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit
claimed that “[o]nce a defendant’s guilty plea is accepted, the prosecution
is at the same stage as if a jury had just returned a verdict of guilty after a
trial.”97
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit noted that when a federal official
performs an “act of consequence” that Congress has not authorized,
reversal may be required even if the parties consented to it.98 The court
held that “[t]his narrow exception to waiver and forfeiture is necessary for
91. Harden, 758 F.3d at 891.
92. Id. at 889.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 888–89 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).
97. Id. at 889. The court explains:
Unlike the preliminary nature of voir dire—which is an important, but
preliminary, juncture that will be followed by numerous other substantive
opportunities to contest the government’s evidence, case, and conduct before any
determination of guilt—the acceptance of a guilty plea is dispositive. It results in
a final and consequential shift in the defendant’s status. For this reason, the
acceptance of the guilty plea is quite similar in importance to the conducting of a
felony trial. And it is clear that a magistrate judge is not permitted to conduct a
felony trial, even with the consent of the parties.
Id.
98. Id. at 890.
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the review of judicial authority to act with consent.”99 The court explained
that without the exception, “district courts would never know whether the
[FMA] authorizes them, with the defendant’s consent, to refer [an
additional duty] to a [magistrate] judge.”100
However, the Seventh Circuit assumed, albeit incorrectly, that
Congress has not authorized magistrate judges to accept guilty pleas as part
of their “additional duties” in the FMA.101 The Supreme Court has noted
that the FMA evinces a belief that magistrate judges are qualified and
competent to handle matters that are delegated to them so long as the
parties consent.102 Therefore, if a defendant perceives any threat of injury
from the absence of an Article III judge, he need only decline to consent to
the presence of the magistrate judge.103 However, when the defendant does
consent to the magistrate’s role, in terms of voir dire proceedings or a plea
colloquy, the magistrate has jurisdiction to perform this additional duty.104
Thus, the Seventh Circuit reopened what had appeared to be a closed
question: the role of the federal magistrate in an overburdened judicial
system and the tension created with individuals’ Due Process rights.
III. RESOLVING THE QUESTION
In light of Congress’ inclusion of section 636(b) indicating the
presumption of unenumerated duties, the overall efficiency of the expanded
role of federal magistrates, and the consent requirement, the Fourth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits’ approach to felony guilty pleas will likely be the
enduring one.
The Seventh Circuit’s conservative conclusion was misguided for
several reasons. First, it has been long accepted practice within that very
circuit for a magistrate to conduct a plea colloquy.105 This engaged inquiry
involves much more discretion and complexity on the part of the magistrate
than simply accepting a guilty plea.106 Second, the plea colloquy
essentially leads to the acceptance of a guilty plea.107 Without the plea
colloquy, the judge—whether magistrate or district court—could not accept

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 890–91.
Id.
Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 935 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 935–36.
Harden, 758 F.3d at 891.
United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id.
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the plea because the judge would have no basis on which to accept it.108
This shows that the plea colloquy and the plea acceptance are truly
inseparable.109 Therefore, the acceptance of the guilty plea is very
comparable with the plea colloquy, and thereby, permissible as an
additional duty under the FMA. Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of
the consent requirement on the basis of the gravity of the waiver ignores
the long accepted truth that individuals may waive even their most
fundamental rights. For these reasons, the question of the expanding
powers of the federal magistrate will likely be resolved in accordance with
the views of the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.
Furthermore, there are practical drawbacks to allowing every
defendant to withdraw his or her guilty plea after a magistrate judge
accepted it. As the Benton court notes, defendants will essentially be
asking for a “dry run or dress rehearsal—a procedure in which a defendant
can agree to a plea before a magistrate judge, and then withdraw that plea
without any complaint that the Rule 11 hearing was deficient in any
way.”110 This has the potential to render plea agreements before magistrate
judges meaningless.111 Additionally, it would be a complete waste of
judicial resources when the defendant withdraws his plea for no reason.112
The proceeding before the magistrate judge would be a nullity and “it may
encourage defendants to use magistrate-led colloquies as go-throughs in
order to gauge whether they may later experience ‘buyer’s remorse.’”113
Lastly, district courts that currently employ magistrate judges to
conduct plea hearings might feel pressure to revisit their plea procedures.
This may lead some district courts to stop delegating plea hearings to
magistrates; however, this would only exacerbate the docket tensions
already felt by district courts. These very tensions are what led to the
creation of the office of magistrate judges.114 Therefore, allowing
magistrate judges to accept pleas for the purposes of Rule 11 preserves
judicial resources—the very goal underlying the creation of the office of a

108. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c), (d), (f) (explaining what a court must inquire about,
what it should advise a defendant, and what it should determine before accepting a plea).
109. Benton, 523 F.3d at 431.
110. Id. at 432–33.
111. See United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677 (1997) (noting that “[w]ere
withdrawal automatic in every case” for any reason, “the guilty plea would become a mere
gesture, a temporary and meaningless formality reversible at the defendant’s whim”).
112. See Benton, 523 F.3d at 432–33.
113. Id. at 433.
114. United States v. Khan, 774 F. Supp. 748, 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (explaining that the
FMA was enacted to help reduce the district courts’ overwhelming caseload).
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magistrate judge—and prevents litigants from exploiting bifurcated plea
procedures.
CONCLUSION
Making the district court’s management of cases more efficient has
gone beyond a mere desire and become a necessity with the growing
caseload of district courts today.115 Given the burdens of a growing district
court caseload and the fact that over 97% of criminal convictions result in
guilty pleas,116 efficiency has necessitated an expanding role for magistrate
judges. Within that expanded role lies a greater need for delegation to
magistrate judges to assist in the practice of guilty plea acceptance.117
Despite that need, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the additional
duties clause of the FMA is in conflict with the opinions of the Fourth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the several
circuits interpreted the additional duties clause in light of the Supreme
Court’s decisions and concluded that federal magistrates may permissibly
accept felony guilty pleas with the consent of the defendant. These three
circuits have all similarly reasoned that overseeing duties such as the plea
colloquy is analogous to accepting a guilty plea in responsibility and
importance, and thus, is rightly delegated to a magistrate judge as an
“additional duty” when the defendant consents.118 Reasoning that “the
prevalence of guilty pleas [did] not render them less important”,119 the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged the importance of judicial efficiency but
declined to adopt its sister circuits’ interpretation. Instead the Seventh
Circuit drew an analogy between the importance of a felony trial with the
gravity of accepting a guilty plea120 and concluded that this duty was not
within the purview of the additional duties clause of the FMA.
Ultimately, the only valid concern that remains true today is the
overburdened caseload of the federal district courts. Guilty pleas help

115. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014).
116. See U.S. District Courts Criminal Statistical Tables For The Federal Judiciary
Table D-4, in STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (Dec. 31, 2013),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2013/d
ecember/D04Dec13.pdf [http://perma.cc/PZ3T-AZU6] (finding that of 84,060 total criminal
convictions in a twelve-month period, 81,955 were the result of guilty pleas).
117. See Harden, 758 F.3d at 891 (explaining the desire to promote efficiency in the
district courts and the prevalence of guilty pleas today).
118. See e.g., Benton, 523 F.3d at 432; Woodard, 387 F.3d at 1333; Ciapponi, 77 F.3d at
1250.
119. Id. at 891–92.
120. Id. at 888–89.
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district court judges lighten their caseload and increase the overall
efficiency of the court system. Magistrates, in turn, aid these district court
judges by taking on duties similar to those of their Article III counterparts.
By denying magistrate judges the ability to accept felony guilty pleas, the
result will be judicial inefficiency and an inefficient use of magistrate
judges during the plea process. In sum, it is clear that the volume of guilty
pleas will never decrease. Nevertheless, magistrate judges can help
alleviate the overwhelming caseload by accepting guilty pleas, consistent
with the purpose of the FMA.
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